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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                       
 
DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge. 
 
    This appeal requires interpretation of the "Income from 
Other Sources" provision of the Unisys Corporation Long Term 
Disability Plan (the "LTD Plan" or the "Plan").  The provision 
advises the Plan participant that the "benefits you receive may 
be adjusted if you receive pension benefits from ... other 
sources." 
    Appellants, employee-participants in the Plan, contend that 
only benefits they themselves receive from other sources may be 
deducted from Plan benefits.  Unisys, on the other hand, contends 
that deductions must be made not only for benefits the 
participants receive from other sources but also for benefits 
which participants' dependents receive from other sources. 
    The district court, agreeing with Unisys, granted summary 
judgment in favor of Unisys and in favor of Travelers Insurance 
Company, the administrator of claims requests.  This appeal 
followed. 
    The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and under 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1132(e)(1) and 1132(f) (jurisdiction of participants' claims 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.).  We have jurisdiction over 
the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Review of the grant of 
summary judgment is plenary. 
          I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
                      A.  Factual Background 
    Unisys is the product of the merger in September 1986 of the 
Burroughs Corporation ("Burroughs") and the Sperry Corporation 
("Sperry").  Each of those corporations had, prior to the merger, 
long term disability ("LTD") plans.  Each of the former plans 
provided that the employer must adjust benefits by (i) the Social 
Security disability benefits paid to the participants and (ii) 
the Social Security benefits to which the participants' spouses 
and children were entitled on account of the participants' 
disability. 
    The language providing for each kind of deduction was 
explicit.  The Burroughs LTD Plan effective January 1, 1984 
provided that monthly benefits were to be reduced by the amount 
of Other Income Benefits.  Other Income Benefits included 
"[i]ncome benefits available under ... [t]he Federal Social 
Security Act ... including benefits available thereunder to or 
for any and all of your dependents ... on account of your 
disability...."  (App. at 533-34). (Emphasis added). 
    The Sperry LTD Plan called for a reduction from monthly 
benefits of Other Income Benefits.  "Other Income Benefits" 
included: 
         5.  The amount of disability or retirement benefits 
             under the United States Social Security Act, The 
             Canada Pension Plan, or the Quebec Pension Plan, 
             or any similar plan or act, as follows: 
 
             a.  disability benefits for which: 
 
                    i.  you are eligible, and 
 
                   ii.  your spouse, child or children are 
                        eligible because of your disability; 
                        .... 
 
(App. at 565).  (Emphasis added). 
    Upon the merger of Burroughs and Sperry the resulting 
corporation, Unisys, proceeded to draft a new plan for the 
employees of the constituent corporations.  The new LTD Plan 
became effective on April 1, 1988, but the drafting process 
continued for a considerable period of time thereafter. 
    In August 1988 Travelers, at Unisys' request, prepared and 
forwarded to Unisys a draft of the proposed text of the LTD Plan.  
The draft, in the form of a marked-up printer's proof dated June 
20, 1988, contained an "Income from Other Sources" text that 
expressly provided for the offset of LTD benefits by the amounts 
of dependent Social Security benefits.  (App. at 455-56). 
    At the same time Unisys' Director of Benefit Programs and 
Planning, Mary Massman, undertook to draft a number of benefit 
plans including a new LTD Plan.  She drew heavily upon the 
Burroughs and Sperry plans, "cut and pasted" them and produced 
the new Unisys LTD Plan document.  This document was adopted 
rather than the proof which Travelers had provided. 
    Under the Unisys LTD Plan as prepared by Ms. Massman, 
employees could elect to participate by agreeing to pay the 
applicable rates for coverage.  The Plan is fully funded by 
employee contributions.  Participants qualifying for LTD benefits 
would receive "66-2/3% of your pay if you are totally disabled."  
Benefits "continue for so long as you are totally disabled, until 
you recover or reach the maximum benefit period."  (App. at 316- 
17). 
    The income from other sources language differed 
significantly from the language of the Sperry and Burroughs Plans 
and from the language of the Travelers proof.  The new LTD Plan 
did not provide in so many words for a deduction of Social 
Security benefits paid to dependents.  Its income from other 
sources provision read: 
    The LTD you receive may be adjusted if you receive 
    pension benefits from Unisys and/or disability income 
    from other sources, such as Social Security, Workers' 
    Compensation or state disability benefits.  If the 
    combination of benefits from these sources and the 
    Unisys LTD Plan equals more than 75% of your pay, the 
    Unisys LTD benefit will be reduced to bring the total 
    benefit from all sources to this 75% level.  Regardless 
    of this feature, if you qualify for an LTD benefit, you 
    will receive at least $100 per month from the Plan. 
 
(App. at 316).  (Emphasis added). 
    At her deposition Ms. Massman testified that this language 
was intended to include adjustments for Social Security benefits 
received by dependents as well as by the disabled employee: 
    A.  Okay.  It was always the intent of the company that 
        if income was payable by virtue of a disability of 
        one of our participants that that income would be 
        taken into account in determining the offset. 
        Because it was only payable by virtue of the fact 
        that the person was disabled. 
 
        Therefore, it didn't seem necessary to stipulate the 
        difference between the two.  Because it was only 
        being paid because our participant was disabled. 
 
        So it was always our intent to offset the individual 
        and the family Social Security disability benefit. 
 
(App. at 495). 
 
    A.  Because an individual or a family member would have 
        received no Social Security absent that disability. 
        To me it was a source of income, that was the sole 
        result of the fact that our participant was disabled. 
        Therefore, it did not seem necessary to specify 
        separately 'family' or 'individual'. 
 
                             .  .  . 
 
    Q.  As I understand your testimony, the words 'family' or 
        'dependent' were not used because you just didn't feel 
        it was  necessary? 
 
    A.  That's correct. 
 
    Q.  All right.  The matter was clear. 
 
    A.  It was very clear to me. 
 
(App. at 488). 
 
    Unisys, as Plan administrator, had the right to interpret 
the Plan's terms: 
    The Plan administrator has authority to control and manage 
    the operation and administration of the plans. 
 
                             .  .  . 
 
    The administrator for processing benefit requests will pay 
    benefits in accordance with the terms of the plans.  All 
    final decisions with respect to the administration and 
    interpretation of the terms of the plan, however, remain 
    with the plan administrator. 
 
(App. at 320A, 320B). 
 
    After the Plan became effective in April 1988 Unisys 
distributed explanatory materials to its employees.  Its 1991 
Enrollment Guide issued in the fall of 1990 provided the first 
notice to all employees that LTD benefits were reduced by 
dependent Social Security benefits.  There was no modification at 
that time of the text of the LTD Plan or of its Summary Plan 
Description.  The 1992 Enrollment Guide did not contain a 
comparable notification. 
    In the spring of 1993, with effect from January 1, 1993, 
Unisys republished its LTD Plan.  This document expressly states 
that benefits are subject to reduction by amounts of dependent 
Social Security awards.  Unisys asserts that the new language 
expressed a continuation, rather than a change, of an existing 
provision. 
    From the outset, upon Unisys' instructions, Travelers 
reduced benefits payable under the Plan by the amounts of Social 
Security benefits payable not only to Plan participants but also 
by the amounts payable to dependents.  Until early 1991, when 
questioned about the appropriateness of the deductions on account 
of dependent benefits, Travelers supported its practice by 
sending to the claimant a copy of the printer's proof, 
representing that it constituted the text of the LTD Plan.  This 
proof was not the text of the Plan and had never been adopted by 
Unisys. 
                      B.  Procedural History 
    The present proceedings evolved from two complaints filed on 
behalf of Unisys employees who claimed that their disability 
benefits had been wrongfully reduced on account of Social 
Security benefits awarded to their dependents.  The Roberts case, 
a class action, was filed in the District of Columbia.  The 
McFeely case, also a class action, was filed in the Supreme Court 
of the State of New York. 
    The Roberts complaint asserted four claims:  Claim I sought 
recovery from the Plan for its reduction of LTD benefits contrary 
to Plan provisions.  Claim II sought to require Unisys and 
Travelers to make the Plan whole for the payment on the ground 
that it was occasioned by their breach of fiduciary duties in 
administering the Plan.  In Claim III Roberts sought on his own 
behalf injunctive relief requiring Unisys and Travelers to 
establish appeals procedures which comply with applicable law.  
In Claim IV Roberts sought on his own behalf statutory penalties 
for Unisys' failure timely to provide requested Plan documents. 
    By stipulation and order in the Roberts case the class was 
certified, the case was transferred to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, and four additional persons were permitted to 
intervene as class representatives. 
    The McFeely action, which asserted claims which tracked 
Claims I and II of the Roberts case, was removed to the Eastern 
District of New York.  The Panel on Multi-District Litigation 
ordered it transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
where it was consolidated with the Roberts case. 
    After completion of discovery the Roberts class 
representatives moved for summary judgment on class Claim I.  
Unisys moved for summary judgment on class Claims I and II.  
Travelers moved for summary judgment on class Claim II, the only 
claim asserted against it.  The district Court rendered a 
decision in January 1994. 
    The Unisys LTD Plan provided that "[t]he Benefit you receive 
may be adjusted if you receive pension benefits from Unisys 
and/or disability income from other sources, such as social 
security...."  The district court found that "the language in 
dispute is not facially ambiguous" and thereupon engaged in an 
analysis prescribed in Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business 
Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1980).  Applying 
Pennsylvania law, Mellon Bank ruled that it is the obligation of 
the judge "to hear the proffer of the parties and determine if 
there is objective indicia that, from the linguistic reference 
point of the parties, the terms of the contract are susceptible 
of differing meanings."  Id. at 1011.  The object of the district 
court's inquiry, of course, was to determine if, despite its 
facial lack of ambiguity, the language "benefits you [the Plan 
participant] receive" was reasonably susceptible of meaning 
"benefits you [the Plan participant] and your dependents 
receive". 
    The district court relied upon several linguistic reference 
points:  (i) "... the linguistic reference point is, in part, the 
manner in which dependent social security benefits had been 
treated in the prior plans of Burroughs and Sperry."  (Slip Op. 
at 5); (ii) "... another linguistic reference point is the social 
security benefits available to a plan participant, what triggers 
their availability and the purpose they serve."  (Slip Op. at 5); 
(iii) "[w]hen reading the deposition of Mary Massman, the 
Director of Benefit Programs and Planning for Unisys, and the 
person who drafted the present plan, the linguistic reference 
point of Unisys' interpretation that social security benefits 
include primary as well as dependent benefits, is further 
clarified."  (Slip Op. at 6). 
    Relying on these "linguistic reference points", the district 
court concluded, "... the term 'you receive' as it appears in 
'Income From Other Sources' is subject to reasonable alternative 
interpretations, one of which is set forth in plaintiff's brief, 
the other in defendant's brief.  In short, the words in the above 
text are ambiguous."  (Slip Op. at 7). 
    Having found ambiguity, the district court noted that the 
Plan provides that all decisions with respect to its 
interpretation remain with Unisys, the Plan administrator.  The 
court applied the deferential standard of review prescribed by 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), to the 
effect that in these circumstances a determination of the plan 
administrator must be upheld unless it was arbitrary and 
capricious.  The court found that Unisys' interpretation was not 
arbitrary and capricious. 
    Having reached these legal and factual determinations the 
district court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on 
Claim I (the Plan interpretation claim) and granted Unisys' 
motion for summary judgment on that claim.  Since Claim II 
against Unisys and Travelers (the breach of fiduciary duty claim) 
was based upon the premise that Unisys and Travelers acted 
contrary to the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Plan, 
that claim could not survive in light of the disposition of Claim 
I.  Therefore the district court granted Unisys' and Travelers' 
motions for summary judgment on Claim II. 
    We conclude that the district court erred in its application 
of Mellon Bank and its progeny and that the language of the 
"Income From Other Sources" provision of the Unisys LTD Plan is 
unambiguous.  It requires (for the period prior to the Plan's 
January 1, 1993 amendment) adjustment for benefits which the Plan 
participants receive from other sources; it does not require (or 
permit) adjustment for benefits which participants' dependents 
receive from other sources.  Consequently the order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Unisys on Claims I and II and the 
order granting summary judgment in favor of Travelers on Claim II 
will be reversed.  The case will be remanded with directions to 
enter judgment in favor of the class plaintiffs on Claim I and 
for further proceedings on Claim II and the remaining areas of 
dispute on Claim III in accordance with this opinion. 
                         II.  DISCUSSION 
    The provision which is at issue in this case reads: 
         The LTD benefit you receive may be adjusted if you 
    receive pension benefits from Unisys and/or disability 
    income from other sources, such as Social Security.... 
 
    Whether an ERISA plan is ambiguous is a question of law.  
Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 967 F.2d 90, 92 (3d Cir. 
1992).  "The strongest external sign of agreement between 
contracting parties is the words they use in their written 
contract.  Thus, the sanctity of the written words of the 
contract is embedded in the law of contract interpretation."  
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 
1009 (3d Cir. 1980). 
    As the district court acknowledged, "the language in dispute 
is not facially ambiguous."  On their face the words "benefits 
you receive" mean benefits which the Plan participants receive.  
They do not mean benefits which the Plan participants and the 
Plan participants' dependents receive.  This usage is consistent 
with the language used throughout the Plan.  "You" refers to the 
participant.  When a dependent is referred to, the reference is 
explicit. 
    In Mellon Bank the court recognized that there may be some 
situations where the parties use words differently from their 
common meaning.  To address that possibility the judge will "hear 
the proffer of the parties and determine if there is objective 
indicia that, from the linguistic reference point of the parties, 
the terms of the contract are susceptible of different meanings."  
Id. at 1011.  However, the court warned that "our approach does 
not authorize a trial judge to demote the written word to a 
reduced status in contract interpretation.  Although extrinsic 
evidence may be considered under proper circumstances, the 
parties remain bound by the appropriate objective definition of 
the words they use to express their intent....  Trade terms, 
legal terms of art, numbers, common words of accepted usage and 
terms of a similar nature should be interpreted in accord with 
their specialized or accepted usage unless such an interpretation 
would produce irrational results or the contract documents are 
internally inconsistent."  Id. at 1013. 
    Benefit offsets are common features of LTD plans.  There is 
an almost even split among Fortune 500 company LTD plans between 
those which provide for offsets of only the employee's Social 
Security disability benefits and those which also provide for the 
offset of family Social Security disability benefits.  (App. at 
619).  It is a simple task of draftsmanship to specify which 
offsets are applicable in any particular plan. 
    There is no evidence in the record which supports Unisys' 
argument that the words "benefits you receive" are susceptible of 
the meaning "benefits you and your dependents receive."  Two of 
the linguistic reference points upon which the district court 
relied to find ambiguity (the language of the prior plans and 
Social Security disability benefit practices) actually support 
appellants' position that there is no ambiguity in the language 
used.  The third linguistic reference point upon which the court 
relied is the testimony of the drafter of the Plan (Ms. Massman) 
that she intended to provide for the offset of dependent 
benefits. 
    The manner in which dependent social security benefits had 
been treated in the prior plans of Burroughs and Sperry is not a 
linguistic reference point justifying a departure from the facial 
meaning of the Unisys Plan.  Both the Burroughs and the Sperry 
plans contained language which specifically provided for 
dependent offsets.  The absence of such language in the Unisys 
Plan simply confirms the plain meaning of "benefits you receive." 
It does not include dependent benefit offsets. 
    Nor are the Social Security benefits available to plan 
participants a linguistic reference point creating ambiguity in 
the Unisys Plan.  Social Security disability benefits are of two 
kinds - those awarded to the disabled person and those awarded to 
the disabled person's dependents.  The statutory provisions grant 
directly to wives and children (including divorced wives and 
children not living in the household of the disabled person) 
Social Security disability benefits.  42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b) and 
402(d).  The statute provides that they "shall be entitled" as 
individuals in their own right to such benefits, a right spelled 
out in the regulations - 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.330-404.333 for wives 
and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.351-404.369 for children.  These payments 
are deemed to be the property of the wife or child. 
    Because of the twofold nature of Social Security disability 
awards - primary and dependent - LTD plans must specify whether 
one or both kinds of awards are to be offset from plan benefits.  
The Social Security disability award structure does not create 
ambiguity in the Unisys Plan.  Rather it confirms that the Plan's 
language unambiguously provides for the offset of primary Social 
Security benefits and not dependent benefits. 
    To rely upon Ms. Massman's testimony as a linguistic 
reference point is to fall into the trap which Mellon Bank warned 
against:  "... in order to interpret contracts with some 
consistency, and in order to provide contracting parties with a 
legal framework which provides a measure of predictability, the 
courts must eschew the ideal of ascertaining the parties' 
subjective intent and instead bind parties by the objective 
manifestations of their intent."  Id. at 1009.  The fact that 
while Ms. Massman was cutting and pasting the Burroughs and 
Sperry plans she intended to include dependent benefits in 
"benefits you receive" is irrelevant.  If the Plan language were 
in fact ambiguous the subjective intent of the Plan's sponsor 
might, along with other evidence, be relevant in ascertaining its 
meaning.  Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 967 F.2d 90, 96 
(3d Cir. 1992).  However, the undisclosed, subjective intent of 
the draftsman cannot be relied upon to render unambiguous 
language ambiguous. 
    Unisys argues that Plan participants "both literally and 
figuratively 'receive' their dependents' Social Security 
benefits."  (Unisys Br. at 6).  Unisys notes that in the usual 
case a participant will benefit from the fact that his dependent 
receives a Social Security award because it will assist him in 
meeting his support obligation to his dependent.  Unisys further 
notes that in some situations, such as when a dependent is a 
minor, Social Security benefits may be paid directly to the 
participant to hold for the dependent. 
    These observations do not change the meaning of the Plan 
language.  If offsets were to be made whenever the Plan 
participant benefited from a Social Security award to another 
person, the Plan language would have so stated.  Not all 
dependent Social Security awards result in an incidental benefit 
to the disabled plan participant and therefore an offset of that 
nature would require an inquiry into the extent a Plan 
participant benefited from Social Security awards to his 
dependents.  Neither Unisys nor Travelers ever conducted such an 
inquiry when awarding benefits under the Plan, and the Plan 
language does not call for such an inquiry. 
    The fact that in some cases a Plan participant may take 
custody of the Social Security award made to a dependent does not 
mean that the participant receives the award.  Disability 
benefits paid to family members such as children are designed to 
provide the recipient for loss of support he or she sustains 
because of the disability of a parent.  These awards are the 
property of the dependent.  Where it appears that a dependent 
because of youth or mental or physical condition may be unable to 
manage the proceeds of the award, a representative payee will be 
appointed if that is determined to be in the best interests of 
the beneficiary.  20 C.F.R. §§  404.2001-404.2030.  The 
representative payee must use the payments only for the use and 
benefit of the dependent consistent with regulatory guidelines 
and reporting requirements.  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2040-404-2045; 20 
C.F.R. § 404.2065.  The fact that a disabled Plan participant may 
be designated as the representative payee does not render him the 
recipient of the award. 
    Unisys relies heavily on Hopkins v. Cohen, 390 U.S. 530 
(1968).  In Hopkins the plaintiff's attorney challenged the lower 
court's refusal to award him fees for his successful efforts in 
securing both primary and dependent social Security benefits.  
The applicable statute and regulations permitted the claimant to 
seek a fee for his attorney not to exceed 25 percent of "past 
benefits due you".  (Emphasis added).  The district court ruled 
that the "past benefits due you" did not include past benefits 
due the claimant's dependents which the attorney succeeded in 
recovering.  The Supreme Court stated "[t]hat seems to us to be 
too technical construction of the Act which we need not adopt.  
In this instance, proof of the husband's 'claim' results in a 
package of benefits to his immediate family; and those benefits 
inure to the benefit of the head of the family who files the 
'claim'".  Id. at 534. 
    Hopkins provides no assistance in interpreting the Unisys 
LTD Plan.  The Court was required to interpret a statute and seek 
the intent of Congress in a context far removed from a dispute 
over the meaning of an ERISA plan document.  The canons of 
construction and the methodology of interpretation of a remedial 
legislative enactment differ from those applicable to the 
interpretation of a contract or trust instrument.  E.g. 
Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission v. Hon. 
Hazel O'Leary,        F.3d        (3d Cir. 1996).  Hopkinsprovides no 
support to Unisys' position. 
    Thus we have concluded as a matter of law that the language 
of the Income From Other Sources provision of the Unisys LTD Plan 
is unambiguous.  It provides that the benefits which a 
participant receives may be adjusted for disability benefits 
which the participant himself receives from other sources, such 
as Social Security.  It does not provide for adjustments for 
disability benefits which a participant's dependents receive from 
other sources. 
    This conclusion requires that the judgment in favor of 
Unisys on Claim I must be reversed and that summary judgment on 
Claim I must be entered in favor of the plaintiff class. 
    The summary judgment in favor of Unisys on Claim I led to 
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Unisys 
and Travelers on the Claim II breach of fiduciary duty claim.  
The breach of fiduciary duty was alleged to have arisen out of 
the deduction of dependents' benefits in the face of a Plan 
provision which unambiguously permitted the deduction of only the 
other benefits of a Plan participant.  If the Plan permitted 
deduction of dependents' benefits, as the district court found, 
Unisys' and Travelers' deduction of such benefits could not have 
been a breach of a fiduciary duty. 
    The circumstances have changed now that it has been 
determined that deduction of dependents' benefits are not 
provided for under the Plan and that the deductions for 
dependents' benefits which were made in this case were 
unauthorized.  Unisys and Travelers argue that even in these 
circumstances the undisputed facts require that summary judgment 
be granted in their favor on Claim II.  They urge that an error 
in interpreting the Plan is not a breach of a fiduciary duty.  
Travelers contends that as a matter of law it was not a fiduciary 
and therefore could not be charged with a breach of a fiduciary 
duty.  These are questions which the district court should 
consider in the first instance.  The judgment in favor of Unisys 
and Travelers on Claim II will be reversed.  On remand the 
district court will reconsider the motions for summary judgment 
on those claims in the light of this opinion and the record 
before it. 
                         III.  CONCLUSION 
    The order of the district court granting summary judgment in 
favor of Unisys on Claims I and II and the order of the district 
court granting summary judgment in favor of Travelers on Claim II 
will be reversed.  The case will be remanded with directions that 
judgment in favor of the class plaintiffs be entered on Claim I 
and for further proceedings on Claim II and with respect to the 
remaining areas of dispute on Claim III in accordance with this 
opinion. 
                                            
